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HIROAKI KUROMIYA, ANDRZEJ PEPŁO SKI 
THE GREAT TERROR
Polish-Japanese Connections
The Great Terror of 1937-1938 took place against the backdrop of war threat. 
The defendants of the famous Moscow trials were tried and executed as German, 
Japanese and Polish spies. When closely examined, the majority of the lesser-known 
cases, too, show that they were tried as cases of foreign espionage, defeatism and 
other similar charges related to war and foreign threat. Yet when war is discussed in 
scholarly literature, it focuses almost exclusively on Germany with whom the Soviet 
Union did fight a long and bitter war. This is understandable, given that wars with 
Poland and Japan were much more limited: the September 1939 war with Poland 
was one-sided and swift with Poland easily dismembered; and the August 1945 war 
against Japan/Manchukuo was equally one-sided and swift with Japan decisively 
defeated. Yet, surprisingly the numbers of repressed at the time of the Great Terror 
as Polish and Japanese spies and agents far surpassed those repressed as German 
spies and agents. The NKVD statistics show that in 1937-1938, 101,965 people 
were arrested as Polish spies, 52,906 as Japanese spies and 39,300 as German spies 
to be followed by Latvian, Finnish, Estonian, Romanian, Greek and other “spies.”1 
All major countries (Germany, Poland, Japan, Britain, France and others) engaged 
in espionage against the Soviet Union just as the Soviet Union engaged in espionage 
against these countries, so why were Poland and Japan more intensely targeted than 
Germany? In May 1937 I.V. Stalin explicitly told K.E. Voroshilov and N.I. Ezhov 
that the main enemy was the German intelligence service.2
1. V.N. Khaustov, V.P. Naumov, N.S. Plotnikova, eds., Lubianka: Stalin i Glavnoe upravlenie 
gosbezopasnosti NKVD 1937-1938 [The Lubianka: Stalin and The NKVD Chief Administration 
of State Security](M.: Mezhdunarodnyi fond “Demokratiia,” Fond A.N. Iakovleva, 2004), 
660.
2. Quoted in V.K. Vinogradov, “Tret´ia reforma organov bezopasnosti (1934-1941),” [“The 
third reform of the Organs of State Security (1939-1941)”], Trudy Obshchestva izucheniia 
istorii otechestvennykh spetssluzhb, [Works of The Society for the Study of Soviet Special 
Services], v. II (M.: Kuchkovo pole, 2006), 93.
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In this essay we discuss briefly the intelligence activity of Poland and Japan 
against the Soviet Union and their collaboration. We suggest general reasons for the 
targeted attack against Polish and Japanese “spies”: first, by 1937 and 1938 Stalin 
had probably decided to destroy Poland as a country; second, in the 1930s Japan 
was a dangerous and unpredictable country and therefore had to be weakened to the 
maximum degree possible; third, Germany was a dictatorship not unlike Stalin’s 
own regime with which Stalin saw the possibility of a short-term deal even though, 
given Hitler’s ultimate goal, he knew well that the deal could not be enduring.
Charges of “espionage,” “subversion” and so forth had no substance in the 
vast bulk of the cases processed under Stalin. According to Stalin, spying did 
not necessarily consist of placing secret agents in foreign countries: it also 
consisted of such mundane tasks as the clipping of newspapers.3 By this logic, 
nearly every newspaper reader could be considered a foreign spy. Not merely 
reading but entertaining a certain thought was tantamount to spying, according 
to L.M. Kaganovich who said in December 1936, “If they stand for [the] defeat 
[of the Soviet Union], it’s clear that they are spies.”4 Characteristically, Stalin was 
extremely hardheaded in these matters. He said in May 1937, “From the point of 
view of intelligence, we cannot have friends: there are clear enemies and there are 
potential enemies. So we cannot reveal any secrets to anyone.”5 By contrast, Poland 
and Japan exchanged intelligence and appeared to trust one another. They therefore 
must have appeared all the more dangerous to Stalin.
Many of those repressed as Polish and Japanese “spies” were arrested according 
to special operations. Most if not all those repressed as Polish “spies” were 
probably arrested according to the “Polish Operation” (NKVD Order No. 00485, 
dated 11 August 1937).6 There was no specific “Japanese Operation,” but most 
are believed to have been arrested in connection with the wholesale deportation 
of ethnic Koreans from the Far East based on the 21 August 1937 resolution of the 
government and the party,7 the “Kharbintsy Operation” (NKVD Order No. 00593 
dated 20 September 1937), an operation directed against the former employees (and 
their families) of the Chinese Eastern Railway (sold to Manchukuo in 1935)8 and 
on the basis of NKVD Order No. 52691 dated 22 December 1937 on the arrest 
of politically suspect ethnic Chinese.9 In addition, numerous Polish and Japanese 
3. O.A. Rzheshevskii, O. Vekhviliainen, eds., Zimniaia voina 1939-1940 [The Winter War, 
1939-1940], v. II (M.: Nauka, 1998), 207.
4. Voprosy istorii, no. 1 (1995): 6 (December 1936 Central Committee plenum).
5. Vinogradov, “Tret´ia reforma organov bezopasnosti…,” 93.
6. Khaustov, Naumov, Plotnikova, eds., Lubianka i Glavnoe upravlenie gosbezopasnosti, 
301-303.
7. N.L. Pobol´, P.M. Polian, Stalinskie deportatsii 1928-1953 [Stalin’s Deportations, 1928-
1953] (M.: MFD-Materik, 2005), 83-84.
8. E.A. Bakirov, ed., Butovskii poligon, 1937-1938 gg., [The Firing Range in Butovo, 1937-
1938] t. 1 (M.: Institut eksperimental´noi sotsiologii, 1997), 355-356.
9. This order has not been published yet.
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“spies” were arrested according to other special operations, particularly NKVD 
Order No. 00693 dated 23 October 1937 (which mandated the arrest of all people 
who had defected to the Soviet Union by crossing international borders, regardless 
of the motives and circumstances of their defections)10 and NKVD Order No. 00698 
dated 28 October 1937 (to “arrest all Soviet citizens who are connected to the staff 
of foreign diplomatic offices and who visit their businesses and private premises” 
and to “place under constant surveillance all members of the German, Japanese, 
Polish and Italian embassies”).11 
National Prejudices
What role did national prejudices play in the Great Terror? The distrust between 
the Russians and the Poles is well documented and, although not an ethnic Russian, 
Stalin identified himself with Russia. In modern times, Poland has suffered at the 
hands of Russia. Russia, in turn, has suspected Poland’s “inherent” anti-Russian 
sentiments. Poland’s rage is probably best exemplified by the literary work of 
Poland’s “national poet,” Adam Mickiewicz who deplored the subjugation of Poland 
to foreign rule. In his Konrad Wallenrod (1828) Mickiewicz appears to suggest 
that treachery and deceit are morally justified to save one’s nation. It seems likely 
that Mickiewicz’s enormous popularity in Poland encouraged Russia’s mistrust. 
In any case, in spite of the anti-Polish climate in Russia, Stalin himself chose not 
to sacrifice his political goals for whatever prejudices he may have had. In fact, 
when Stalin deemed it imperative to conclude a non-aggression pact with Poland 
in 1931 to secure the western borderlands, he feared that anti-Polish sentiments in 
the Soviet Union would be an obstacle to his goal. In August 1931, Stalin urged 
M.M. Litvinov, the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, not to “yield to so called 
‘public opinion’” (“the common, narrow-minded mania of ‘anti-Polonism’” and 
to proceed to conclude a non-aggression treaty with Poland.12 Indeed in 1932, 
with the tension mounting in the east dramatically owing to Japan’s invasion of 
Manchuria in September 1931, Stalin succeeded in concluding non-aggression 
pacts with Poland. (Stalin concluded similar treaties with France, Estonia, Latvia 
and Finland at the time.)
10. Oleg Mozokhin, Pravo na repressii: Vnesudebnye polnomochiia organov gosudarstvennoi 
bezopasnosti (1918-1953) [The Right of Repression: The Extrajudicial Power of the Organs 
of State Security (1918-1953)] (M.: Kuchkovo pole, 2006), 160. See also RGASPI (Rossiiskii 
Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial´no-Politicheskoi istorii — Russian State Archive of Social-
Political History), f. 17, op. 162, d. 22, l. 114 (31 January 1938 decision by the Politburo of the 
Communist Party).
11. Quoted in I.L. Shcherbakova, Nakazannyi narod: Repressii protiv rossiiskikh nemtsev [The 
Punished People: Repression against Soviet Germans] (M.: Zven´ia, 1999), 47 and Vadim 
Abramov, Kontrrazvedka: Shchit i mech protiv Abvera i TsRU [Counterintelligence: Sword 
and Schield against the Abwehr and CIA] (M.: Iauza Eksmo, 2006), 105.
12. R.W. Davies, Oleg V. Khlevniuk, E.A. Rees, eds., The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence 
1931-1936 (New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 2003), 68.
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As for Japan, it is known that Stalin considered the territorial loss in the 1904-
1905 Russo-Japanese War a national insult. Very fond of listening to the music “On 
the Hills of Manchuria” by I.A. Shatrov (the lyrics of which by S. Petrov includes 
lines such as “You fell for Rus, perished for Fatherland, / Believe us, we shall 
avenge you / And celebrate a bloody wake”), he appeared bent on taking revenge.13 
Stalin indeed took revenge in 1945 and declared: 
The defeat of the Russian forces in 1904 during the Russo-Japanese war left painful 
memories in the people’s consciousness. It left a black stain on our country. Our 
people waited, believing that the day would come when Japan would be beaten and 
the stain eliminated. We, the people of an older generation, have waited forty years 
for this day. And now this day has come.14
Stalin actively used ethnic and national prejudices for political purposes. His 
1931 speech about Russian history as a history of “continual beatings owing to 
backwardness,” beatings by the Mongol khans, the Swedish feudal lords, the 
Polish-Lithuanian pans, the Anglo-French capitalists and the Japanese barons is 
well known. In 1937, anti-Japanese sentiment was such that when, out of diplomatic 
concern, Litvinov refused to sanction the arrest of a Japanese citizen on the island 
of Sakhalin, he had to qualify his refusal: “It is perfectly reasonable to suspect 
that all Japanese in the USSR are spies without exception.”15 In order to carry 
out the Polish Operation, A.I. Uspenskii, the head of the Ukrainian secret police 
even stated in 1938 that “all Germans and Poles living in Ukraine are spies and 
saboteurs.”16 Stalin did not discourage these sentiments. (Likewise, while Stalin 
was probably not inherently anti-Semitic, he was not averse to using popular anti-
semitism for political purposes, especially towards the end of his life.)
Nevertheless, little proof exists to suggest that Russia’s and Stalin’s anti-
Polonism and other prejudices played a central causal role in the Great Terror. As 
is seen in the case of Japan, it was state interests that guided Stalin. According to 
the US President Harry Truman, Stalin said, “it would be incorrect to be guided by 
injuries or feelings of retribution”: such feelings are “poor advisers in politics.”17 In 
1945, Stalin told the visiting Czechoslovaks: 
13. Artem Sergeev, Ekaterina Glushik, Besedy o Staline [Conversations about Stalin] (M.: 
Krymskii most-9D Forum, 2006), 22-23, 78.
14. I.V. Stalin, Sochineniia [Works], v. II (15) (Stanford, CA, 1967), 214.
15. Khaustov, Naumov, Plotnikova, eds., Lubianka i Glavnoe upravlenie gosbezopasnosti, 298.
16. Quoted in Z arkhiviv VUChK-HPU-NKVD-KHB, nos. 1-2 (1998): 215. This sentiment 
reflected NKVD Circular No. 68 dated 22 August 1937 which stated that an “overwhelming 
majority of foreigners living in the USSR are the organising source of espionage and diversion.” 
Quoted in Nakazannyi narod, 46.
17. Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, v. I (New York: Doubleday, 1955), 364.
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I hate the Germans, but hatred must not hinder us from objectively assessing 
them. The Germans are a great people, very good technical people and organisers. 
Good, innately brave soldiers. It’s impossible to eliminate them. They’ll stay.18 
Stalin also often praised Poland as a “good nation” and the Poles as brave fighters, 
the third most “dogged” soldiers after the Russians and Germans.19
Ethnic and national prejudices may have played an auxiliary role and aggravated 
the Great Terror, but it can be assumed that it did not play a central causal role. 
Polish Intelligence
Before Adolf Hitler’s ascension to power, Poland and Japan presented the greatest 
threat to the Soviet Union. Until then Germany and the Soviet Union, both inimical 
to the Versailles settlement after World War I, maintained a degree of amicable 
relations and even engaged in secret military collaboration. By contrast, Poland 
and Japan appeared politically and militarily hostile to the Soviet Union. According 
to Karl Radek, in the early 1930s Stalin feared a simultaneous Japanese-Polish 
attack.20 There was good reason for Stalin’s fear. Poland considered the Soviet 
Union, along with Germany, the greatest threat to its hard-won independence while 
Japan regarded the Soviet Union, along with the USA, as the greatest obstacle to its 
imperialist ambitions. In other words, the Soviet Union was a hypothetical enemy 
for both Poland and Japan, and they acted accordingly. The Soviet Union responded 
in kind. The two sides actively spied on each other. In this triangular relationship, 
Poland and Japan found common ground and cooperated, a cooperation that dates 
back to the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War.21 
In 1923 Japan invited the Polish specialist of Russian/Soviet cyphers Jan 
Kowalewski to train Japanese military cypher specialists.22 (In its war against 
the Bolshevik Government in 1919-1920 Poland had put its expertise in signal 
18. Istochnik, no. 5 (1997): 128.
19. Hiroaki Kuromiya, Stalin (Profiles in Power) (Harlow: Longman, 2005), 181.
20. Louis Fischer, Russia’s Road from Peace to War: Soviet Foreign Relations 1917-1941 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 222. The exact date of Stalin’s remark is not known, but it 
appears to have been in 1931 or 1932.
21. See Ryszard więtek, Lodowa ściana: Sekrety polityki Józefa Piłsudskiego 1904-1918 [An 
Ice Wall: The Secrets of Józef Piłsudski’s Policy] (Cracow: Platan, 1998).
22. Manuscript by Shunjir  kubo, “Tairo ang  kaidoku ni kansuru s shi narabini senkun 
nado ni kansuru shiry ,” [“Materials on the Beginning of Decoding Soviet Cipher, Military 
Instructions”] available at BBKT (B eish  b ei kekyūjo toshokan — The Library of the 
Self-Defense Institute, Ministry of Self-Defense), Tokyo. See also Ewa Pałasz-Rutkowska, 
Polityka Japonii wobec Polski 1918-1941 [Japanese Policy towards Poland, 1918-1941] 
(Warsaw: Nozomi, 1998), 77-78. Kowalewski was subsequently decorated by the Japanese 
Government.
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intelligence to good use in defeating its enemies.23 It was due partly to Poland’s 
expertise that Britain broke Germany’s Enigma machine during World War II.) 
Japan sent cypher specialists to Poland for training on several occasions well into the 
1930s. Likewise, Poland and Japan continued to exchange intelligence concerning 
the Soviet Union throughout the 1920s, the 1930s and even during WWII when 
they were technically at war.24
In both Poland and Japan, not all politicians and military leaders considered 
the Soviet Union the most dangerous potential enemy. In Poland, opinions split 
as to which posed the greater danger, Germany or the Soviet Union. Similarly, in 
Japan, there was a split in assessing the relative danger of the USSR and the USA. 
Nevertheless, neither country neglected anti-Soviet intelligence after the Russian 
Civil War ended and diplomatic relations had been established with the Soviet 
Union.
Much of Poland’s anti-Soviet intelligence was carried out by the Dwójka, 
the Second Department of the General (later Chief) Staff of the Polish Army. 
Poland was well situated to carry out anti-Soviet intelligence, because many of 
the citizens of the newly independent state were former citizens of the Russian 
Empire, intimately familiar with the way of life in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. 
Moreover, in 1937 there were more than 636,000 ethnic Poles in the Soviet Union, 
about seventy percent of them in Ukraine,25 on whose service Poland expected to 
draw. During WWI Piłsudski, the future leader of Poland, had founded a secret 
military organisation (Polska Organizacja Wojskowa, POW) for the purpose of 
intelligence and subversion against Poland’s enemies (Russia, later Soviet Russia, 
and Germany). Although it ceased to exist after the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-
1920, the Dwójka absorbed many of its members, inherited its expertise and 
sought to utilise the remnants of its conspiratorial organisational structures in the 
Soviet Union.26 Many workers of the Dwójka were former members of the POW. 
Jerzy Niezbrzycki (Ryszard Wraga), a native of Ukraine and a former citizen of 
the Russian Empire who spoke Russian and Ukrainian in addition to Polish, had 
been a member of POW and had fought in the Polish-Soviet War. From 1927-1929 
he worked as an intelligence operator under the guise of a diplomat at the Polish 
23. Grzegorz Nowik, Zanim zlamano “Enigmę”: Polski radiowywiad podczas wojny z 
bolszewicką Rosją 1918-1920 [Before the Enigma was broken: Polish radio Intelligence during 
the War against Soviet Russia, 1918-1920] (Warsaw: Rytm, 2004).
24. See our work, Między Warszawą a Tokio: Polsko-Japońska współpraca wywiadowcza 
1904-1944 [Between Warsaw and Tokyo: Polish-Japanese Intelligence Cooperation, 1904-
1944] (Toru : Wydawn. Adam Marszałek, 2009). Note also Ewa Pałasz-Rutkowska, Andrzej 
T. Romer, Historia stosunków polsko-japońskich 1904-1945 [A History of Polish-Japanese 
Relations, 1904-1945] (Warsaw: Bellona, 1996).
25. N.A. Aralovets, V.B. Zhiromskaia, I.N. Kiselev, eds., Vsesoiuznaia perepis´ naseleniia 
1937 g. Kratkie itogi [The All-Union Population Census of 1937: Brief Summaries] (M.: 
Institut istorii SSSR, AN SSSR, 1991), 83, 94.
26. Andrzej Pepło ski, Wywiad w wojnie polsko-bolszewickiej 1919-1920 [Intelligence in the 
Polish-Bolshevik War, 1919-1920] (Warsaw: Bellona, 1999), 301 and idem., Wywiad Polski 
na ZSSR 1921-1939 [Poland’s Intelligence against the Soviet Union] (Warsaw: Bellona, 1996), 
27-28.
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Consulates in Kharkiv and Kyiv from where in December 1929 he was expelled on 
charges of espionage. In 1932 Niezbrzycki was appointed the head of the Dwójka’s 
“Eastern Section” (in charge of the Soviet Union), where he worked until 1937.27 
There is little evidence, however, that the remains of the POW functioned at all in 
the 1920s and beyond in the Soviet Union, owing largely to the intense counter-
intelligence work of the Soviet Union. Although in 1931-1932, apparently for 
intelligence purposes, the Dwójka did collect information on former POW members 
in Ukraine,28 there is no evidence that the POW revived in any form at all. All the 
same, from 1933 onwards numerous ethnic Poles in the Soviet Union, particularly 
in Ukraine, were arrested as members of POW.29
As Niezbrzycki’s case suggests, Poland, probably like many other countries 
and certainly Japan and the Soviet Union, used diplomatic missions extensively to 
cover its intelligence activity. Until 1937 Poland maintained consulates in Moscow, 
Leningrad, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Minsk and Tiflis where they ran intelligence operations.30 
Diplomatic posts in other key countries, particularly those surrounding the Soviet 
Union such as Japan, Finland, Turkey, Latvia, Estonia and Czechoslovakia as well 
as Germany, France and Yugoslavia served the same purpose.
One of the most important strategic goals of independent Poland was to 
weaken and, if possible, destroy the Soviet Union and for this purpose Poland 
sought to encourage the separatist movements of national minorities in the Soviet 
Union. In the 1920s and 1930s Poland operated the “Promethean Movement,” an 
“anticommunist international, designed to destroy the Soviet Union and to create 
independent states from its republics.” 
It brought together grand strategists of Warsaw and exiled patriots [Ukrainians, 
Georgians, Azeris, and others] whose attempts to found independent states had 
been thwarted by the Bolsheviks [and was] supported by European powers hostile 
to the Soviet Union, morally by Britain and France, politically and financially by 
Poland.31
27. Włodzimierz Bączkowski, “Jerzy Niezbrzycski (R. Wraga) 1902—1968,” Niepodległość, 
no. 23 (1990): 99-102; Ministerstvo inostrannykh del, Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR 
[Document of Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union], v. XII (M.: Izd-vo politicheskoi literatury, 
1967), 774.
28. RGVA (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voennyi Arkhiv — Russian State Military Archive), 
f. 308k, op. 3, d. 230.
29. Mikołaj Iwanow, Pierwszy naród ukarany: Stalinizm wobec polskiej ludności kresowej 
(1921-1938) [The Nation Punished First: Stalinism towards the Polish People in the Eastern 
Borderlands] (Warsaw: Omnipress, 1991), 141-145.
30. For the list of such units, see Pepło ski, Wywiad Polski na ZSSR, 126-127.
31. Timothy Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist’s Mission to Liberate Soviet 
Ukraine (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005), 40. A comprehensive account is given 
in Sergiusz Mikulicz, Prometeizm w politycze II Rzeczypospolitej [Prometheanism in the 
Politics of the Second Republic] (Warsaw: Ksią §ka i Wiedza, 1971).
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The most important group for the Promethean movement was Ukraine. Poland 
contained a large Ukrainian minority, many of whom were Ukrainian nationalists 
and irredentists with Soviet Ukraine. Just as many of these Ukrainian nationalists 
considered Communist Russia to be their enemy (occupier of Easter [Soviet] 
Ukraine), so too did they regard Poland as enemy (occupier of “Eastern Galicia” 
or “Western Ukraine”). It was vital for Poland to divert their attention and political 
energy away from Poland towards the Soviet Union. Even though the Ukrainian 
nationalists engaged in political terror against Polish authorities, Poland tolerated 
their presence in the country and allowed and even encouraged their anti-Soviet 
activity. An unknown number of them are believed to have acted as Polish agents 
as well. An incident that took place in the spring of 1932 is characteristic. In May 
of that year, according to an Japanese record intercepted by Soviet spies, 
the Japanese military attaché in Moscow, Torashir  Kawabe, enquired of his 
colleague in Warsaw, Hikosabur  Hata, whether the rumour he had heard 
in Moscow that two members of the Polish General Staff were executed for 
espionage for the Soviet Union was true. Two days later, Hata, who worked 
closely with the Polish intelligence agency, responded: the Polish General Staff 
recently sent 20-odd secret agents to Ukraine, all of whom, however, were caught 
by the GPU. Two “secretaries” of the General Staff had been bought off by the 
Soviets and leaked secret information to them. They were court-marshaled and 
sentenced to be shot. The Kawabe-Hata correspondence was intercepted by the 
Soviet secret police and reported to Stalin.32 
Although it is not known whether these agents were Poles or Ukrainians, the 
Ukrainians continued to send their agents into the Soviet Union from Poland. For 
example, agent No. 7 was repeatedly sent across the border from 28 September to 
5 October 1932, from 25 November to 1 December 1932 and from 29 December 
1932 to 4 January 1933. Finally after he was sent on 19 September 1933, he did not 
return: he was killed by the OGPU. Agent No. 102 similarly crossed the Polish-
Soviet borders six times in 1932-1933, but after he was despatched into Soviet 
territory on 22 January 1933, he failed to return, apparently apprehended by the 
OGPU.33 According to Soviet data, between 1922 and 1936, the Soviet Ukrainian 
border guards arrested 1,763 “spies,” 66 “diversionary elements” and 5,326 
“smugglers” (of whom 479 were armed). The Soviet data also indicate that there 
were 144 cases of armed conflict with border transgressors from Poland, as a result 
of which 60 “bandit groups” (both local and foreign) were “liquidated.” Likewise, 
between 1921 and 1935 the Soviet Belarusan border guards apprehended 4,902 
“spies,” 550 “diversionary elements” and 13,656 “smugglers.” 282 cases of armed 
32. Hiroaki Kuromiya, The Voices of the Dead: Stalin’s Great Terror in the 1930s (New Haven-
London: Yale University Press, 2007), 220-221.
33. Mikulicz, Prometeizm, 111-113.
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conflict were also recorded.34 Needless to say, Poland feared that many border-
crossers from the Soviet Union were Soviet spies. For what appears to be in the 
first few years of the 1930s, Poland, according to Japanese sources, captured 1,500 
“Soviet spies” along its borders with the Soviet Union.35
As in any intelligence and espionage, Poland’s strengths were also its 
weaknesses. The Soviet secret police recruited a number of able POW members. 
Two famous examples are Wiktor Steckiewicz and Igancy Dobrzy ski, who were 
arrested by Soviet authorities in 1920 (at the time of the Polish-Soviet War) and 
then recruited through the personal intervention of the then Soviet secret police 
chief Feliks Dzerzhinskii, a Pole. They subsequently became prominent Soviet 
secret police operatives as Viktor Kiiakovskii and Ignatii Sosnovskii respectively.36 
It was Steckiewicz/Kiiakovskii who became the architect of the famous “Trest” 
operation, a brilliant Soviet counter-intelligence operation in the 1920s which set 
up a fictitious anti-Soviet underground organisation.37
Likewise, many Ukrainian émigré organisations in Poland and elsewhere were 
penetrated by Soviet agents. The penetration was mandated especially after the 
assassination in October 1933 in L´viv of the Soviet secret police agent working 
under the cover of Assistant Consul, Andrei Mailov, by the OUN (Organisation of 
Ukrainian Nationalists) terrorist Mykola Lemyk.38 The most famous example is the 
master Soviet spy Pavel Sudoplatov, who penetrated the OUN and succeeded in 
assassinating its head, Ievhen Konovalets, in Rotterdam in May 1938.39 As it turned 
out, the OUN division in Finland was led by the Soviet agent K. Poluved´ko.40
34. P.A. Ivanchishin, A.I. Chugunov, Pogranichnye voiska SSSR, 1919-1938 [The Border 
Guard Roops of the Soviet Union, 1919-1938] (M.: Nauka, 1972), 77.
35. “Soren no ch h  hanch h  ni tsuite,” [“On Soviet Intelligence and Counterintelligence”] 
stamped “Secret,” dated September 1936 (BBKT). More generally, see Andrzej Pepło ski, 
Kontrwywiad II Rzeczypospolitej [The Counterintelligence of the Second Republic] (Warsaw: 
Bellona, 2002).
36. In 1936 Dobrzy ski/Sosnovskii was arrested in 1936 and executed in 1937 in Moscow as 
a “Polish spy.” After Stalin’s death, he was rehabilitated. See Pepło ski, Wywiad Polski na 
ZSSR, 232-234; A. Papchinskii, M. Tumshis, Shchit, raskolotyi mechom: NKVD protov VChK 
[The Shield Cracked by the Sword: the NKVD against the VChK] (M.: Sovremennik, 2001), 
243-245, 284-285; N.V. Petrov, K.V. Skorkin, Kto rukovodil NKVD 1934-1941: Spravochnik 
[NKVD Leaders, 1934-1941: Directory] (M.: Zven´ia, 1999), 390-391.
37. He died in 1932 in line of duty in Mongolia, Papchinskii, Tumshis, Shchit, raskolotyi 
mechom, 244, 250, 330; A. Dienko, ed., Razvedka i kontrrazvedka v litsakh [People of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence] (M.: Russkii mir, 2002), 229.
38. Petro Mirchuk, Narys istorii Orhanizatsii Ukrains´kykh Natsionalistiv 1920-1939 [A Study 
of the History of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, 1920-1939] (Munich: Ukranisk´e 
vydavnytsvo, 1968), 337-348. Lemyk did not know that Mailov was an OGPU functionary. 
For Mailov’s belonging to the OGPU, see Aleksandr Kolpakidi and Dmitrii Prokhorov, KGB: 
spetsoperatsii sovetskoi razvedki [The KGB: Special Operations of the Soviet Intelligence] 
(M.: Olimp, 2000), 234.
39. Pavel Sudoplatov, Anatoli Sudoplatov, Special Tasks (Boston: Little Brown, 1994), 12-29.
40. D.V. Viedenieiev, H.S. Bystrukhin, Mech i tryzub: Rozvidka i kontrrozvidka rukhu 
ukrains´kykh natsionalistiv ta UPA (1920—1945) [Sword and Trident: Intelligence and 
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Even though the Polish Intelligence services were infiltrated by Soviet agents, it 
was widely recognised that in the 1920s and 1930s, as far as the Soviet Union was 
concerned, Polish intelligence, along with Finnish intelligence, was probably the 
finest in the world.
Both Poland and the Soviet Union acknowledged that they spied on each other. 
On a number of occasions in the 1920s and 1930s, the countries exchanged political 
prisoners (including spies), the last in 1936.41
In the mid-1930s, the ethnic Polish population in the Soviet Union came 
increasingly under suspicion. By the mid-1930s, like ethnic Germans,42 ethnic 
Poles in the Soviet Union were probably subjected to detailed census. In 1931-1933 
the Soviet secret police used its agents and informers, particularly teachers at Polish 
schools, to investigate the households of ethnic Poles under the guise of teachers’ 
visits. They informed the police on the Polish household’s political orientations, 
on whether they retained connections with Polish diplomatic missions and other 
sensitive matters such as their attitudes towards the collectivisation of agriculture.43 
Any contact with foreign consulates became fatally dangerous. As Tymothy Snyder 
has argued, efforts to prove absence of contact became a “diabolical trap”: 
 By late 1936, the [Polish] consulate [in Kiev] was dealing with the desperate 
applications of people caught in a diabolical trap: petitioners who wished to prove, 
somehow, that they had no contacts at all with Poland. Consular employees knew 
that these people were innocent of espionage, but how could they certify an absence? 
From the Soviet point of view, their very attempt to prove their innocence probably 
proved their guilt. Once they had contacted the Polish consulate, they had contacts 
(as the Soviet saw matters) with Polish intelligence.44 
Shortly after the December 1934 murder of Sergei Kirov in Leningrad, Moscow 
began to deport ethnic Poles, Germans and Finns as well as other politically suspect 
from its border zones.45 
Counterintelligence of the Ukrainian Nationalist Movement and the UPA] (Kiev: Heneza, 
2006), 122.
41. Pepło ski, Wywiad Polski na ZSSR, 122-123 and, more generally, Wojciech Materski, 
Robocza dyplomacji: Wymiana więźniów politycznych pomiędzy II Rzecząpospolitą a 
Sowietami w okresie międzywojennym [The Roadsides of Diplomacy: Exchange of Prisoners 
between the Second Republic and the Soviet Union in the Interwar Period] (Warsaw: Instytut 
Studiów Politycznych PAN, 2002).
42. “As early as 1934, as a result of the Nazis coming to power in Germany, the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party decided to have full and accurate data collected on all 
Germans working in industry and in administrative bodies, and to see to it that this survey 
should not be publicly known.” According to one who took part in the collection, by late 1934, 
the Soviet government “had before it the most precise data on the numbers and occupations 
of all the Germans living in the USSR. All the secret service work and repressions carried out 
later were guided by the data we collected and arranged.” Ingeborg Fleischhauer and Benjamin 
Pinkus, The Soviet Germans: Past and Present (London: C. Hurst, 1986), 34, 91.
43. Kuromiya, The Voices of the Dead, 224.
44. Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War, 124-125.
45. Pobol´, Polian, Stalinskie deportatsii, 45-73.
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Japanese Intelligence
Like Poland, Japan’s General Staff and the Kwantung Army in Manchuria had 
their own intelligence units (the Second Departments). In addition, in Manchuria 
there existed numerous special intelligence agencies (military missions, or tokumu 
kikan). Before Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 there were six Kwantung 
Army special intelligence agencies, in Kharbin, Manchouli, Mukden, Jilin and 
elsewhere. In 1931-1934, when the foundation of its puppet government Manchukuo 
brought Japan and the Soviet Union face to face in northeast China, the Kwantung 
Army added seven more intelligence agencies in Manchukuo (in Qiqihar, Hailar, 
and Heihe and elsewhere) to confront the Soviet Union. Like other countries, Japan 
used its diplomatic posts for intelligence. Not merely its missions in the Soviet 
Union but in those countries surrounding the Soviet Union, particularly Finland, 
Sweden, Poland and Turkey, were used for this purpose. Japan’s intelligence activity 
increased sharply after the Manchurian invasion. Remarkably, from 1931 Japan 
stationed a full-time military attaché in the three small Baltic states (the attaché in 
Latvia served as the attaché in Estonia and Lithuania) and collaborated with Baltic 
intelligence services against the Soviet Union. From 1932 an intelligence officer 
was attached as a consular official to the Japanese consulates in Vladivostok, 
Khabarovsk, Novosibirsk and the Manchukuo consulate in Chita, and from 1934 
in Blagoveshchensk (Manchukuo) and in Odessa as well. From 1933, Japan began 
to post a military attaché to its legation in Tehran, Persia (Iran from 1935). In 1936 
Japan set up the office of military attaché in Afganistan, but the Japanese officer 
was promptly expelled for espionage in 1937.46
Like Poland, Japan showed keen interest in the minorities within the Soviet 
Union whose independence movements could be utilised for political and military 
purposes. Among the tens of thousands of émigré “Russians” in Manchuria were 
numerous ethnic Ukrainians and Poles. In certain districts in the Vladivostok area 
ethnic Ukrainians accounted for more than half of the population. There were 
Chinese, Koreans, Tungusic people (such as Manchus, Oroqens or Orochons), 
Mongols (Buriat) and other ethnic groups on both sides of the Soviet-Manchu 
(Japanese) borders. Japan used all these people for intelligence in Manchuria, 
Sakhalin and elsewhere in the Far East.47 The Japanese military also recruited 
Japanese orphans, trained them in Chinese and Mongolian languages and cultures 
as well as radio communication and set them on expeditions to “Outer Mongolia” 
(i.e. today’s Mongolia), Tibet and other remote areas of strategic importance to 
Japan. Through them Japan collected vital intelligence on these little-known areas. 
Many of the boys failed to return.48 By the mid-1930s Japan and the Soviet Union 
46. Tsutao Ariga, Nihon riku kai gun no j h kik  to sono katsud  [The Structure and the 
Activity of the Japanese Military Intelligence] (Tokyo: Kindai Bungeisha, 1994), 84-100.
47. The best source is the manuscript of memoirs by Etsuo K tani, “Manshū ni okeru j h  
kinmu,” [“Intelligence Work in Manchuria”] available at BBKT.
48. Takez  Obata, Kakusaretaru rekishi [Hidden Story] (Tokyo: Hokushind , 1951), 170-171.
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began to compete actively for influence as far as Xinjiang (Sinkiang or Chinese 
Turkestan) in western China.49
Japan’s imperial ambitions extended far and wide. Already in the 1920s Japan 
targeted the Northern Caucasus (with its large Muslim population as well as ethnic 
Greeks, Germans and Persians) as a potentially productive site for subversion 
against the Soviet Union.50 Some documents related to Japan’s espionage against 
the Soviet Union presumably lost in WWII later surfaced in Soviet hands and copies 
were submitted at the Tokyo Trial as evidence of Japan’s anti-Soviet machinations. 
Japan targeted Trotsky supporters inside and outside the Soviet Union for possible 
agents. In 1931-1932, the Japanese military attaché in Warsaw Hikosabur  Hata 
worked closely with émigré Muslim leaders against the Soviet Union. According to 
the Russian scholar Aleksei Kirichenko, in March 1934 the Japanese military attaché 
in Turkey, Masatane Kanda, sent a detailed report to Tokyo on his intelligence work 
in the Caucasus regions. According to the report, Kanda operated Azeris, Crimean 
Tatars and Persians for subversive work in the Soviet Union. He even reported that 
there were approximately 1,000 armed forces in Persia that could be despatched to 
Soviet territory and another 1-2,000 Caucasian forces in Turkey that could be used 
for the same purpose.51
Japan and Poland had common political and military interests and worked 
closely, although there is little evidence that the Polish-Japanese cooperation was 
officially sealed in any written agreements. As far as the Promethean movement was 
concerned, Japan did not get involved directly. If anything, Japan remained aloof, 
even though Poland presented the movement as pro-Japan and provided to Japan 
intelligence gained through it.52 Probably Japan feared Britain and France working 
behind Poland. In any case, the Soviet Union suspected that the two countries had 
signed a secret agreement in the autumn of 1931 whereby Poland was obliged to 
deflect the Soviet forces upon itself when Japan began to advance its troops against 
the Soviet Union. This intelligence report, acquired by a Soviet agent in Poland, 
was sent to Stalin in March 1932.53 This may be why Stalin told Radek, as discussed 
earlier, that he feared a simultaneous Japanese-Polish attack.
Japan’s and Poland’s interests did not always coincide. The question of Ukraine 
and Belarus is evidence of this. In 1933 the Japanese General Staff set up a 
“Conspiracy” (Subversion) Organ (B ryaku Kikan) in Berlin and Paris. The one 
49. E.M. Primakov, ed., Ocherki istorii rossiiskoi vneshnei razvedki, [Studies of the History of 
Russian Foreign Intelligence] v. III (M.: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1997), 217.
50. The National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, MD), RG331, Numerical 
Evidentiary Documents as Evidence by the Prosecution for Use before the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East, no. 1989 (Kingor  Hashimoto), no. 2460A (Masatane Kanda).
51. Arekusei [Aleksei] Kirichenko, “Kominterun to Nihon, sono himitsu ch h sen o abaku” 
[“The Comintern and Japan: Revealing the Secret Intelligence War”], Seiron (Tokyo), no. 10 
(2006): 108-109.
52. Mikulicz, Prometeizm, 262-270, Gaimush  Gaik  Shiry  Kan (GGSK) (Tokyo), 
B1.0.0.PO/R (May 1938 report from the Japanese Ambassador to Tokyo).
53. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 185, l. 65.
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in Paris did not last long, but the one in Berlin expanded and worked together with 
the Germans. This organ, completely separate from Japan’s diplomatic mission, 
appears to have engaged in, among others, anti-Soviet subversion using émigré 
Ukrainians, Belarusans and people from the Caucasus.54 According to a Japanese 
intelligence officer, the “subversive political activities within the USSR” by Japan 
(and Germany) were to be used “later, in time of war,” “for fifth column purposes.”55 
Some Ukrainian groups were responsive, particularly after the disappointment of 
the 1932 Polish-Soviet non-aggression treaty. They pinned their hopes on Japan as 
a reliable force destined to enter into war against the Soviet Union.56
In general, Poland kept its distance from the White (anti-Soviet) émigré 
Russians whose nationalistic and monarchist orientations Poland distrusted. By 
contrast, Japan used them extensively. Many of them, deeply anti-Soviet, worked 
willingly for the Japanese intelligence services in various capacities.57 According to 
the master Japanese spy, Major General Shun Akikusa, the head of the Intelligence 
Department of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria in 1945, between 1933 and 1936 
he sent 12 spies (mostly émigré Russians) into Soviet territory. Although they were 
supposed to return after collecting military information, “almost no one” returned. 
Similarly, “when most Soviet citizens in Manchukuo (Kharbintsy) returned 
to the Soviet Union in the wake of the 1935 sale of the East China Railway to 
Manchukuo, he managed to hire approximately 20 Soviet citizens. (It is estimated 
that approximately 25,000 Kharbintsy returned to the Soviet Union in 1935-1936. 
The 20 ‘spies,’ then, constituted fewer than 1 out of 1,000 provided that Akikusa’s 
account is to be believed.) Yet only three of them reported back, the first one from 
Irkutsk, the second from Vladivostok and the third from where Akikusa could not 
remember. He could not make contact with these three, however, and received no 
information from them.” Akikusa made these statements under Soviet captivity 
after WWII and died in prison in Vladimir.58
Moreover, from 1933 onwards, Japan, somewhat belatedly, following the 
example of Poland, Germany and other countries, employed the diplomatic courier 
system to protect communication between Tokyo and its overseas diplomatic 
missions, especially in Europe. This courier system was consistently deployed 
from 1936 so that at any given time there were Japanese couriers on the Siberian 
54. Yuriko Onodera, Barutokai no hotori nite. Bukan no tsuma no Dait a sens  [On the Shore 
of the Baltic Sea; A story fo the Great East Asian War by the Wife of a Military Attaché] 
(Tokyo: Ky d  tsūshinsha, 1985), 51-53.
55. See the 1936 “highly secret” mission given to the Berlin office, cited in Kuromiya, The 
Voices of the Dead, 279.
56. See a memorandum of Ukrainian nationalists to the Japanese military attaché in Istanbul 
Masatane Kanda, ibid., 279.
57. This is extensively discussed in K tani, op. cit. and Yukio Nishihara, Zen kiroku Harubin 
tokumu kikan [The Whole Records of the Special Organ in Kharbin] (Tokyo: Mainichi 
Shinbunsha, 1980). John J. Stephan, The Russian Fascists: Tragedy and Farce in Exile, 1925-
1945 (New York: Harper & Row, 1978) also discusses this.
58. Kuromiya, The Voices of the Dead, 256, 287.
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railways. Japanese couriers, many of whom were military intelligence officers, 
estimated the Soviet transport capacity on the railways and even managed to figure 
out a very accurate schedule of the Siberian railways.59 This allowed Japan to 
determine which points in the rail system to attack, which bridges to destroy and so 
on in the event of war. Japan provided the data collected by its couriers to Poland. 
Poland regarded these data highly and, in turn, provided much valuable information 
it obtained about the Soviet Union to Japan.60
Like that of Poland, Japan’s intelligence was penetrated by Soviet agents. As 
it turned out in 1945, many of the White Russians Japan had employed Soviet 
agents.61 It is quite possible that at least some of those Akikusa despatched into 
Soviet territory were in fact Soviet agents. The Japanese Conspiracy Organ in 
Berlin was also deeply penetrated by Soviet agents. The mistress of the chief of 
the Organ was a Russian émigré who was in fact a Soviet agent.62 The Soviet secret 
police also penetrated the office of the military attaché in the Japanese Embassy. 
In December 1931 and February 1932 two stolen memoranda from the embassy 
were circulated among the Politburo members.63 In one of them dated 19 December 
1931, that is after Japan’s conquest of Manchuria, the Japanese Ambassador in 
Moscow K ki Hirota was quoted as having conveyed the following opinion to the 
Japanese General Staff in Tokyo: “On the question of whether Japan should declare 
war on the Soviet Union — I deem it necessary that Japan be ready to declare 
war at any moment and to adopt a tough policy towards the Soviet Union.” Stalin 
underlined this sentence in pencil. Hirota continued: “The cardinal objective of this 
war must lie not so much in protecting Japan from Communism as in seizing the 
Soviet Far East and Eastern Siberia.” Stalin circled the phrases “the Soviet Far East 
and Eastern Siberia” in pencil.64
In the 1920s and 1930s the Soviet Union also successfully deployed “Trest”-like 
fake counterintelligence organisations in Moscow, Siberia and the Far East against 
59. The best account is by a former courier-intelligence office Masakata Suzuki, “Gaik  densho 
shi soren o iku,” Rekishi to jinbutsu, no. 10 (1980): 74-82.
60. Nakano K yūkai, ed., Rikugun Nakano Gakk  [The Nakano School of the Army] (Tokyo: 
Nakano K yūkai, 1978), 170. This book was privately published by the alumni of the Japanese 
spy school Nakano Gakk .
61. See, for instance, Petr Balakshin, Final v Kitae: Vozniknovenie, razvitie i ischeznovenie 
Beloi Emigratsii na Dal´nem Vostoke [Finale in China: Birth, Development and Demise of 
White Emigration in the Far East], 2 vols. (San Francisco: Sirius, 1958-1959).
62. Kenji Suzuki, Chūdoku taishi shima Hiroshi [Ambassador to Germany Hiroshi shima] 
(Tokyo: Fuy  shob , 1979), 94-95.
63. N. Khaustov, V.P. Naumov, N.S. Plotnikova, Lubianka: Stalin i VChK-GPU-OGPU-
NKVD. Ianvar´ 1922-dekabr´ 1936 [The Lubianka: Stalin and VchK-GPU-NKVD, January 
1922-December 1936] (M.: Mezhdunarodnyi fond demokratsii, 2003), 291-295, 298-308.
64. Ibid., 292, 295. In the end, Japan never attacked the Soviet Union. It was the Soviet Union 
that attacked Manchukuo and Japan in 1945. The Soviet Union submitted these documents to 
the Tokyo Trial as evidence of war crime by Hirota. Hirota was hanged.
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Japan (“Shogun,” “Dreamers,” “Maki-Mirage,” “Organizator” and so on).65 Japan 
was often misled by false intelligence supplied by “anti-Soviet” organisations 
which it believed were run by Japan but in fact were run by the Soviet secret police. 
(The Soviet Union even submitted to the Tokyo Trial one such case as evidence 
of Japan’s war crime!) When Poland and Japan exchanged information about the 
Soviet Union, they were sometimes at odds because their data did not match.66 
In 1930 on Ingushetiya in the Caucasus the Soviet secret police operated a fake 
Japanese spy to entrap anti-Soviet forces there.67
The records of Soviet border troops show that in the Far East as in the western 
borderlands, numerous Japanese “spies” and “diversionary elements” operated.68 
Yet former Japanese intelligence officers have testified that it proved extraordinarily 
difficult to penetrate the Soviet borders in the Far East because they were guarded 
extremely tightly. By contrast Japan could not politically stabilise the Manchurian 
side. It did not have enough resources to guard the borders tightly. Moreover, 
the border areas were constantly disturbed by Chinese and Korean Communist 
guerrillas and other “bandits.” By one Japanese estimate, only less than 5 percent 
of Japan’s attempts at penetrating Soviet territory succeeded in the 1930s, whereas 
the success rate of the Soviet penetration of Manchurian territory was at least 65 
percent.69 
The Terror
International espionage and counter-espionage were and are facts of international 
life. The Great Terror took place against this background.
By 1937 the clouds of war thickened in both the east and the west. Hitler’s advance 
into the Rhineland in violation of the Versailles treaty in March 1936 significantly 
increased tension in the west. After the Polish-German non-aggression pact signed 
in January 1934 and Poland’s opposition to the entry of the Soviet Union into 
the League of Nations, Soviet-Polish relations deteriorated (even though the two 
countries had renewed the 1932 Polish-Soviet non-aggression treaty for ten years in 
1934). The Soviet Union increased its subversion against Poland and its military by 
65. “Trest” was a famous Soviet counterintelligence operation using a fake anti-Soviet 
underground organisation. Its architect was a former member of POW turned Soviet secret 
police agent Wiktor Steckiewicz (Viktor Kiiakovskii).
66. “Duel´ razvedok: Rossiia — Iaponiia,” [“Duel of Intelligence: Russia and Japan], broadcast 
by Gosteleradio on 2 March 2005. See also Katsumasa Watanabe, Sugihara Chiune no higeki 
[The Tragedy of Chiune Sugihara] (Tokyo: Taish  Shuppan, 2006), 49.
67. Aleksandr Uralov (A. Avtorkhanov), Narodoubiistvo v SSSR: Ubiistvo chechenskogo 
naroda [Genocide in the USSR: The Murder of the Chechen People] (Munich: Svobodnyi 
Kavkaz, 1952), 3133. We are grateful to Professor Jeffrey Burds for this reference.
68. Ivanchishin, Chugunov, Pogranichnye voiska, 309-692 covering the years from 1929 
through 1938.
69. T kichi Harada, Kaze to kumo to. Saigo no ch h  sh k  [Wind, Cloud: and the Last Officer 
of Intelligence] (Tokyo: Jiyū kokuminsha, 1973), p. 68.
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using Comintern agents and Communists.70 From late 1936 and early 1937 Poland, 
in turn, sought to revive its diversionary activity in the Soviet border areas that had 
been cut back owing to financial difficulties.71
In the east, Japan further advanced into China and Mongolia. Japan extended 
its control to Heibei (a province which included Beijing), where it set up a puppet 
government in 1935. Japan also extended its control to Inner Mongolia where 
in May 1936 it created the Mongol Military Government (Mengjian) under 
Demchugdongrub (Teh Wang). Soviet-Japanese border clashes sharply increased 
in the mid-1930s. Japan’s belligerence prompted Stalin to admit in early 1937 that 
the Soviet Far East was in a “state of semi-war” with Japan.72
The tension in the east led to the “Great Terror” in Mongolia, engineered by 
Stalin in 1937. On 27 November 1934 the Soviet Union concluded a treaty of 
mutual military assistance with Mongolia. On 12 March 1936 the Soviet Union 
and Mongolia renewed their treaty of mutual aid for ten years. In the mean time 
Japan/Manchukuo and Mongolia had a number of border clashes. Manchukuo and 
Mongolia held meetings to resolve the border issues. When it was announced on 25 
November 1936 that Germany and Japan had signed an agreement (Anti-Comintern 
Pact), the Mongolian delegation left the negotiation table. Yet within the Mongolian 
leading circles, there were forces in favour of continuing negotiations with Japan 
and wary of Soviet influence in Mongolia. Stalin responded by a Mongolian 
version of the Great Terror.73 According to an official who defected from Mongolia 
in the summer of 1938, anti-Soviet forces in Mongolia were contemplating an anti-
Soviet insurrection in 1937. Rumours of Japanese military actions in China reached 
Mongolia in July 1937 and agitated the Mongolians. Soon after Soviet military 
forces advanced en masse into Mongolia and terrorised the Mongolians, with tens 
of thousands of Mongolians executed as “Japanese spies.”74
Moreover, from the spring of 1937 onwards, anti-Chinese rebellions engulfed 
Xinjiang, the predominantly Muslim area of western China close to the strategically 
important area of Western Siberia and the Urals.75 Japan sought to take advantage of 
the unrest. Although how much influence it exerted in Xinjiang is not known, Japan 
70. Ia.S. Drabkin, L.G. Babichenko, K.K. Shirinia, Komintern i ideia mirovoi revoliutsii [The 
Comintern and the Idea of World Revolution] (M.: Nauka, 1998), 787, 809-812.
71. Marcin Kwincien  and Grzegorz Mazur, “Działalno ć prometejska i dywersja na wschodzie 
(Relacja Mjr. Włodzimierza Dąbrowskiego)” [“Promethean Activity and Diversion in the East: 
A Report of Major Włodzimierz Dąbrowski”], Zeszyty historyczne, v. 140 (2002): 113-114.
72. N.I. Dubinina, “Tragediia lichnosti” [“The Tragedy of a Personality”], Dal´nii vostok, no. 7 
(1989): 130.
73. Mandafu Ariunsaihan (Mandah Ariunsaihan), “Mongoru ni okeru daishukusei no shins  to 
sono haikei,” [“The Truth of the Great Terror in Mongolia and its Backgrounds”] Hitotsubashi 
rons  (Tokyo), 126, 2 (2001) and Aleksei Pavliukov, Ezhov: Biografiia [Ezhov: A Biography] 
(M.: Zakharov, 2007), 376-390.
74. Sabur  Hayashi, Kant gun to Kyokut  Sorengun [The Kwantung Army and the Far Eastern 
Army of the Soviet Union] (Tokyo: Fuy  shob , 1984), 153-154.
75. See V. Barmin, Sovetskii Soiuz i Sin´tszian 1918-1941 gg. [The Soviet Union and Xinjiang, 
1918-1941] (Barnaul: Izd-vo BGPU, 1999), 159-165.
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had long courted the Xinjiang population. Moscow, in turn, made every effort to 
exclude Japan from Xinjiang: Japan’s conquest of Xinjiang, like Japan’s conquest 
of Mongolia, would have opened a direct path of attack against West Siberian and 
the Urals. Moscow intervened in Xinjiang militarily. Like Mongolia, Xinjiang had 
its own Great Terror in 1937-1938.
Meanwhile, the NKVD, now headed by Nikolai Ezhov, reassessed its foreign 
intelligence. It had so successfully penetrated the émigré anti-Soviet organisations 
that by 1937-1938 the NKVD no longer considered it important to uncover these 
organisations “diversionary, terroristic and espionage” activity in the Soviet 
Union.76 Instead, the police became alarmingly concerned about the penetration of 
Soviet organisations by foreign intelligence. Why this concern, which had always 
existed in the secret police, emerged so strongly in 1936-1938 is not entirely known. 
True, Ezhov entertained deep suspicion of his predecessor’s (Iagoda’s) foreign 
operatives. It is also true that the Soviet Union used fake deserters extensively to 
penetrate foreign countries: the secret police used its agents as convinced anti-
Soviet defectors to fool foreign intelligence.77 It is possible that its own extensive 
use of deception began to haunt Moscow, as war threatened. Alexander Orlov, a 
former NKVD official noted that 
Stalin, who was his own intelligence boss and who liked to take a personal part 
in the cloak and dagger business, warned his intelligence chiefs time and again to 
keep away from hypotheses and “equations with many unknowns” […] He used to 
say: “An intelligence hypothesis may become your hobby horse on which you will 
ride straight into a self-made trap”, and he often interjected during his conferences 
with intelligence chiefs, “Don’t tell me what you think, give me the facts and the 
sources!”78 
Late in his life, Molotov told his interviewer that every day he used to spend half a 
day reading intelligence reports, but insisted that it was impossible to rely on spies, 
who “could push you into such a dangerous position that you would never get out 
of it”: “You have to listen to them, but you also have to verify their information.”79 
In June 1937, Stalin contended that in all spheres but one, the Soviet government 
had defeated the international bourgeoisie, which, however, had beaten the Soviet 
government effortlessly in the area of intelligence operations.80
76. R.N. Baiguzin, ed., Gosudarstvennaia bezopasnost´ Rossii: Istoriia i sovremennost´ 
[State Security in Russia: History and the Present] (M.: ROSSPEN, 2004), 491, 523-524 
(V.N. Khaustov).
77. For example, Obata, Kakusaretaru rekishi, extensively discusses the Soviet use of “fake 
defectors.”
78. Alexander Orlov, Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare (Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press, 1963), 10.
79. Feliks Chuev, Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics (Chicago: I.R. Dee, 1993), 
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Polish-Japanese disinformation may have contributed to the downfall of 
Tukhachevskii and other Red Army commanders. In April 1937 the Soviet secret 
police intercepted a document sent by the Japanese military attaché in Warsaw to 
Tokyo which reported that contact had been established with a special envoy of the 
marshal of the Red Army Tukhachevskii. This was almost certainly disinformation.81 
Interestingly, when the news of the execution of Tukhachevskii and others reached 
the office of the Japanese military attaché in Riga, Latvia, the entire office rejoiced 
at it and celebrated it.82 It should be noted that it is also possible that the intercepted 
document was not Polish or Japanese but Soviet disinformation.
At any rate, Moscow targeted Poland and Japan for counter-offensive. The 
Polish intelligence officer turned NKVD functionary Dobrzy ski/Sosnovskii was 
arrested in late 1936 and executed in 1937. Many others of similar background 
met the same fate. Within the NKVD it was asserted that its Polish operation had 
been a failure, and many associated with anti-Polish intelligence were arrested 
and executed.83 Everyone who dealt with foreigners and foreign agencies began 
to appear suspicious. Just as the Soviet Union recruited double spies out of foreign 
agents, so, it feared, did foreign countries use Soviet agents. Many of the Soviet 
handlers, including translators, of the intelligence sent from Tokyo by the Soviet 
spy, Richard Sorge, were also repressed. The old “anti-Soviet” Tsarist officer, the 
key figure in the Shogun Operation against Japan, Polonskii, was likewise arrested 
and executed.84 Thus, the Great Terror repressed 275 (or 68 percent) out of 450 
Soviet foreign intelligence officials in Moscow and abroad.85
The Polish Operation extended far and wide. NKVD Order no. 00485 noted 
that out of 15,000 “defectors” (perebezhchiki) from Poland, only 9,000 had been 
accounted for. Out of 5,000 “defectors” residing in West Siberia no more than 1,000 
had been accounted for. The order thus specified for arrest these defectors, former 
Polish prisoners of war, political immigrants, Soviet agents exchanged for Polish 
spies and political prisoners, among others.
In the Far East the ethnic Koreans were wholesale deported to Central Asia. 
In ordering this operation, Stalin categorically stated that its aim was to “stop 
the infiltration of Japanese espionage into the Far East Province.”86 According to 
Genrikh Liushkov, the NKVD head in the Far East, who carried out the massive 
Korean deportations, 
81. “M.N. Tukhachevskii i ‘voenno-fashistskii’ zagovor,” [“M.N. Tukhachevskii and the 
‘Fascist-Military’ Conspiracy”] Voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv, vyp. 2 (1998), 29-33.
82. Onodera, Barutokai no hotori nite, 54.
83. See A. Kh. Artuzov’s March 1937 letter to Ezhov in Pauchinskii, Tumshis, Shchit, 
raskolotyi mechom, 282-287.
84. “Duel´ razvedok: Rossiia — Iaponiia.”
85. I.A. Damaskin, Stalin i razvedka [Stalin and Intelligence] (M.: Vecher, 2004), 205.
86. Pobol´, Polian, Stalinskie deportatsii, p. 83.
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Stalin did not trust the Koreans at all. Fearing that as long as they lived near the Soviet 
borders in the Far East, Japan would use them as spies and infiltrate Soviet territory, 
Stalin ordered their deportations from the standpoint of counter-intelligence.87
 Stalin said explicitly, according to Liushkov: 
 It is necessary to clean up the army and its rear in the most determined manner 
from hostile spy and pro-Japanese elements […] the Far East is not Soviet, there 
the Japanese rule […] Stalin resumed the conversation by saying that it was 
necessary in cleansing the rear to terrorize the [Korean] district and the frontier 
so as to prevent any Japanese [espionage] work.88 
Japanese documents suggest that the deportations of Koreans achieved Stalin’s 
goal, at least to an extent: they deprived real Korean spies working for Japan of 
refuge and assistance in the border areas.89
As if to confirm the Soviet suspicion of Polish-Japanese clandestine anti-Soviet 
operations, in December 1937, Poland and Japan held joint military intelligence 
conferences in Harbin and Warsaw to assess the Soviet situation.90
Nearly all foreign diplomatic missions were implicated in spy charges. The 
case of the Japanese Consulate in Novosibirsk in western Siberia, for instance, is 
instructive. The consulate
carefully monitored all sorts of seemingly innocent Soviet activity, including the 
Siberian railway. In 1937, pretending to go on picnics, some Japanese diplomats 
(intelligence specialists) spent most of their days on river banks to observe the 
transport of freight cars, whilst others monitored military bases and military factories. 
Obviously they needed help from local residents (some of whom may have been 
Soviet agents). In late 1937 more than 100 Soviet citizens were arrested as Japanese 
spies and 63 of them were executed. Among them were the consular secretary 
Viacheslav Petrovskii, his sister Ol´ga, the telephone operator at the Consulate, 
Mikhail Mikheev, the chauffeur and Stepan Bylov, the cleaner. The consulate was 
shut down in late 1937.91
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Most foreign consulates in the Soviet Union were forced to shut down. In September 
1937 the Japanese Consulates in Odesa and Novosibirsk were shut down. In 1938, 
the Japanese Consulates in Khabarovsk and Blagoveshchensk met the same fate. 
By the spring of 1938, Germany, Italy, Britain, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Sweden, 
Norway, Denmark and Afganistan had all their Consulates in the Soviet Union 
closed. The number of Japanese consulates were reduced from 9 to 4 (Vladivostok, 
Petrovavlovsk, Okha and Aleksandrovsk, although Manchukuo, Japan’s puppet 
state, maintained one in Chita and another in Blagoveshchensk.) Poland managed 
to keep two, one in Kiev, the other in Minsk, whilst the Soviet Union kept one in 
L´viv and another in Gda sk (Danzig).92
The Soviet fear of foreign penetration also decimated Soviet partisan detachments, 
shock-strike groups, parachute-landing detachments, snipers, demolition experts 
and others who were trained at special schools and stationed in the border areas 
(including Polish and Japanese/Manchurian border areas). Stalin feared that these 
border military legions were so deeply penetrated by foreign spies that the legions 
themselves would be used by foreign countries against the Soviet Union.93 
Conclusion
The Great Terror was a precautionary strike against people who could pose internal 
threat in the event of war.94 Needless to say, it is not that an actual threat existed 
to such an extent that it justified Stalin killing nearly one million people. True, at 
any given time, a degree of internal threat exists in any regime. The Soviet Union 
was no exception. For Stalin to think otherwise would signify poor and reckless 
political leadership. True, foreign intelligence was afoot everywhere. Yet, in spite 
of Stalin’s contention that the international bourgeoisie had beaten the Soviet 
government in the area of intelligence operations, all indications suggest that the 
Soviet intelligence appeared more ubiquitous, more successful and more resourceful 
than that of other countries. Stalin was extraordinarily cautious. Believing that one 
spy could determine the outcome of war, he left nothing to chance. He believed that 
if only 5 percent of the alleged enemies were enemies, it was a big deal (esli budet 
pravda khotia by na 5%, to i eto khleb).95 According to Nikita Khrushchev, Stalin 
believed that “Ten percent of the truth is still the truth. It requires decisive action 
on our part, and we will pay for it if we don’t act accordingly.”96
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There is much evidence that Stalin believed in the ninety percent of the truth, but 
used the ten remaining percent for his political purposes. It was easy to glean the 
critical ten percent from rumours, misinformation and disinformation circulating 
in the world, both in and outside the country. Stalin said privately of his former 
political rivals whom he alleged schemed with Poland, Japan and Germany: 
We were aware of certain facts as early as last year [1936] and were preparing to 
deal with them, but first we wanted to seize as many threads as possible. They were 
planning an action for the beginning of this year. Their resolve failed. They were 
preparing in July to attack the Politburo at the Kremlin. But they lost their nerve 
— they said: “Stalin will start shooting and there will be a scandal.” I would tell 
our people — they will never make up their minds to act, and I would laugh at their 
plans.97 
In October 1938, when he was ending the Great Terror, Stalin stated that Bukharin 
had had “ten, fifteen, twenty thousand” supporters, and that there were as many, 
possibly more, Trotskyites. Their mortal sin, according to Stalin, was not their 
foreign espionage but their opposition to his “revolution from above”: 
Well, were they all spies? Of course, not. Whatever happened to them? They were 
cadres who could not stomach the sharp turn toward collective farms and could not 
make sense of this turn, because they were not trained politically, did not know the 
laws of social development, the laws of economic development, the laws of political 
development. […]How to explain that some of them became spies and intelligence 
agents? […] It turns out that they were not well-grounded politically and not well-
grounded theoretically. They turned out to be people who did not know the laws of 
political development, and therefore they could not stomach the sharp turn.98 
This is convincing evidence against taking Stalin’s allegations about espionage and 
subversion at face value. Clearly, he had other justifications in mind.
Spy-mania existed in many countries in the 1930s. Communists and left-wing 
elements were ruthlessly repressed in Germany, Poland, Japan and elsewhere. 
The Soviet Union and the Comintern did operate its agents in these and other 
countries. As the former Japanese counter-intelligence services recounts the 
political atmosphere of Manchuria in 1937, it was characterised by “unprecedented 
international espionage.”99 Japan arrested numerous suspected Soviet spies. Many 
were tortured to death. The bodies were called “logs” and discarded. In sanctioning 
the use of torture in 1937, Stalin asked why the socialist secret service had to be more 
humane in applying torture against the agents of the bourgeoisie and the enemies 
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of workers and peasants than the bourgeois secret services were in torturing the 
representatives of the socialist proletariat.100 When he made this remark, he may 
well have had Japan in mind. As one former Japanese counter-intelligence officer 
in Heihe (a Manchurian city across the Amur River from Blagoveshchensk) in the 
1930s admitted later anonymously, in his mind the prospect of war justified torture 
and killing: 
“It was said that one enemy spy was mightier than one division of soldiers. I did not 
feel particularly guilty for torturing and killing spies at the time. Now I only pray for 
the souls of these many people.101 
This use of war as justification of terror was probably shared by Soviet torturers 
and executioners. It is the logic of Stalin as well, except that Stalin consciously 
used the war justification for his political purposes — preemptively eliminating his 
political enemies and potential defeatists and fifth columns.
It therefore appears to be utterly irresponsible and patently absurd to claim that 
foreign intelligence was at least indirectly “guilty” of Stalin’s Great Terror, as 
some Russian historians now claim.102 Were this true, every other country could 
have killed millions of its own people and held the Soviet Union at least indirectly 
accountable.
In any case, the war was the defining element of the Great Terror. By then Stalin 
appeared to have concluded that Poland had to be destroyed. Stalin once said that 
“Piłsudski — he is Poland.”103 If so, after Piłsudski’s death in 1935, Poland ceased 
to exist for Stalin. The Promethean movement declined after his death. In 1939, 
Stalin told Dimitrov that formerly 
the Polish state was a nat[ional] state. Therefore revolutionaries defended it against 
partition and enslavement, [but Poland had now become a] fascist state, oppressing 
Ukrainians, Belorussians, and so forth [: the] annihilation of that state under current 
conditions would mean one fewer bourgeois fascist state to contend with! 104 
Remarkably, Moscow even dissolved the Communist Party of Poland in 1937. 
Stalin noted at the time that “the dissolution is about two years late”.105 In 1937-
100. Oleg Mikhailov, “Limit na rasstrel,” [“Limit on Shooting”] Sovershenno sekretno, no. 7 
(1993): 5.
101. Toyotaka Kat , Manshūkoku keisatsu sh shi [A Short History of the Manchukuo Police], 
v. II (Matsuyama: Manm  d h  engo kai ehime ken shibu, 1974), 129.
102. For example, E.P. Laidinen, S.G. Verigin, Finskaia razvedka protiv sovetskoi Rossii 
[Finnish Intelligence against the Soviet Union] (Petrozavodsk: RIF, 2004), 221.
103. Oleg Ken, Moskva i pakt o nenapadenii s Pol´shei (1930-1932 gg.) [Moscow and the Pact 
of Non-Aggression with Poland, 1930-1932] (SPb.: PIIaF RAN, 2003), 110.
104. The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, p. 116.
105. Polibiuro TsK RKP(b) — VKP(b) i Komintern. 1919-1943. Dokumenty (M.: ROSSPEN, 
2004), 760.
 THE GREAT TERROR: POLISH-JAPANESE 669 
1938 Stalin felt no hesitation in repressing Poles and those associated with Poland. 
In 1939 Stalin, in collaboration with Hitler, indeed destroyed Poland.
Japan, on the other hand, was a military power which continued to pose a 
serious threat to the Soviet Union. Stalin could not have destroyed it as he did 
Poland. Moreover, Japan’s political situation was so unstable and unpredictable 
with frequent changes of hands that Stalin found it difficult to devise an effective 
anti-Japan strategy. Enormous precaution was therefore needed to combat Japan’s 
threat. There were not many ethnic Japanese in the Soviet Union. Because Japan 
was demonised in the Soviet Union, those few living in the country went by Korean 
names. In the end the entire Korean population, identified with Japan, became 
suspect and was wholesale deported from the Far East.
By contrast, Stalin found it easier to deal with Germany even though he 
understood that Germany was the main enemy in 1937. Because Germany was 
personally ruled by Hitler as the Soviet Union was by Stalin, Stalin found it easier 
to deal with Germany. Indeed, even when Stalin was killing numerous people as 
German spies, he sent out feelers to Hitler about a possible rapprochement.106 In 
the end, he did strike a deal with Hitler two years later. Stalin could not destroy the 
Soviet Germans as he did the Soviet Poles.
Likewise, the ethnic Chinese fared better than the ethnic Koreans: unlike the 
ethnic Koreans, the ethnic Chinese were not wholesale deported from the Far 
East. Given Japan’s extensive use of ethnic Chinese for espionage and subversion, 
there is no compelling reason why the Koreans should have suffered more than 
the Chinese did at Stalin’s hands. Yet Stalin needed China to fight Japan whereas 
Korea, a colony of Japan, did not even exist as a state. Taking advantage of the 
December 1936 X´ian incident, Stalin and Mao succeeded in turning Chiang 
Kai-shek (a Fascist sympathiser who drew on German military advisers for his 
fight against the Chinese Communists) and his Kuomintang Army against Japan 
to form a united front with the Chinese Communist Party. This change marked an 
important turning point in international politics as well: it defeated one of the aims 
of the “anti-Comintern pact” by detaching China from the pact’s three powers. It 
is not known whether Moscow and the Chinese Communists were behind the July 
1937 Marco Polo Bridge incident that drew Japan into the Chinese quagmire, but it 
greatly helped Stalin by diverting Japan’s aggression away from the Soviet Union. 
In August 1937 Stalin and Chiang signed a non-aggression pact explicitly directed 
against Japan.107 Even though Stalin did not exempt the Chinese from his terror, just 
as he did not the Germans, he could not treat China as an enemy nation.
Thus Poland and Japan became targets for exceptional terror by Stalin. Poland 
and Japan proved exceptional in another respect. They continued to collaborate 
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in anti-Soviet intelligence without betraying each other, even after 1941 when 
technically the two countries were at war. By contrast, Japan and Germany did not 
trust each other even though they worked together against the Soviet Union.108 When 
Hitler concluded the Nazi-Soviet pact in August 1939 without informing his partner, 
Japan, Japan’s cabinet was forced to resign, declaring that the European event was so 
bizarre as to be incomprehensible. Stalin did not have friends, only “clear enemies” 
and “potential enemies”. So he could not understand the extraordinary mutual trust 
of Poland and Japan. At the height of the terror, in January 1938, Stalin tellingly 
referred to a Russian proverb (which was also Lenin’s favourite): Izbavi nas bozhe 
ot “druzei”, a ot vragov my sami izbavimsia (God save us from our “friends,” from 
our enemies we shall save ourselves.)109
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